The Citrus Canker Law, authorizing the destruction of privately owned citrus trees, is constitutional. Haire v. Florida Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Serv., 29 Fla. L. Weekly S67 (Fla. Feb. 12, 2004).

Citrus canker, a bacterial disease that attacks the fruit, leaves, and stems of various citrus plants, can ultimately lead to the death of infected trees.  Section 581.184, Florida Statutes, known as the Citrus Canker Law (Law), was amended in 2002 to require the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“Department”) to remove and destroy all infected citrus trees and all trees within 1900 feet of an infected tree.  The statute also provides for compensation for destroyed trees on a per tree basis.  A number of individuals and municipalities (“Petitioners”) filed suit against the Department challenging the constitutionality of the Law, claiming that it violates substantive and procedural due process rights.

With respect to the substantive due process claim, the Petitioners argued that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied which would allow the destruction of private property only where a threat is “imminently dangerous” and an “actual necessity.”  The Department argued that because the police power authorizes the protection of the public health and welfare, and the Law is part of the police power, only a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate government objective is required.  The Supreme Court agreed.  The Supreme Court held that while destruction of property is an extreme use of the police power, property rights are subject to the fair exercise of that power.  The Supreme Court also noted that the Legislature has reviewed extensive scientific reports on the disease prior to enacting the Law and thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the removal of the exposed trees, even though they may be healthy, is reasonably related to the goal of eradicating the disease.  Additionally, the Supreme Court was satisfied with the compensation requirements of the Law because they only set minimum payments without preventing a landowner from seeking judicial establishment of full and just compensation.

The Petitioners also claimed that the issuance of an Immediate Final Order (IFO) without a pre-deprivation hearing was a violation of procedural due process.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument finding that the only pre-deprivation showing required by the Department is that the trees are 1900 feet from an infected tree.  And, it is only this showing that a District Court – under the Law – reviews on a petition for stay filed within 10 days of the IFO’s issuance.

An additional issue in the case involved the Department’s ability to obtain multiple search warrants based on a single warrant application and affidavit.  The trial court had required an application and affidavit for each property to be searched and prevented the use of electronic signatures for the warrants.  The Supreme Court -- affirming the District Court’s decision to quash the trial court order -- held that so long as probable cause is established to search multiple properties by one application and affidavit, multiple warrants may be issued.  Further, because of growing acceptance of the use of electronic signatures, as well as the reasoning that a judge who permits the use of electronic signatures is “attesting to the act of issuing the warrant,” the use of electronic signatures is sufficient.

Petition for annexation and the ordinance adopting the same, together, may constitute an express written contract waiving sovereign immunity and binding a local government. Waite Development, Inc. v. City of Milton, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D445 (1^st DCA Feb. 19, 2004).

Landowner petitioned the City for voluntary annexation of its property with the intent to develop a subdivision.  The Petition provided that the City would “provide, as construction of the subdivision roads [where] completed, water, sewer, and natural gas...lines to the lot line of each lot.”  The City granted the petition by the adoption of an ordinance.  Although the City provided utilities to the first phase of the subdivision, it refused to provide any utilities for the second phase because of a newly enacted City ordinance that prohibited the City from paying the infrastructure costs for a private developer.

Landowner sued the City, alleging breach of contract and equitable estoppel.  The trial judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding that there was no express written contract and therefore no waiver of sovereign immunity.  The First DCA reversed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in determining that there was no express written contract.  The DCA relied on the basic contractual principle that “several writings may constitute a valid and binding contract when they evidence a complete meeting of the minds...and an agreement upon the terms and conditions of the contract.”  Accordingly, the Complaint alleged an express written contract (i.e., the Petition and the ordinance adopting the same).
 

Injunctive relief may be appropriate where, following preliminary plat approval and developer reliance, a local government alters the zoning of property; however, preliminary injunctive relief may not bypass the procedures required for a permanent injunction. Charlotte County v. Vetter, 863 So.2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

A developer obtained preliminary plat approval to develop a 92-acre parcel near an airport, zoned for a variety of industrial uses.  Thereafter, the County amended its local comprehensive plan and ordinance to create an airport overlay which resulted in a down-zoning of the property.  The County also attempted to place new requirements on the development regarding plat approval and permit applications.  The developer filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief.  The trial court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the County to promptly issue site plan approval and all permits, and prohibiting the application of the new overlay district and standards to the project.

A party seeking preliminary injunction must show the likelihood of irreparable harm, the lack of an adequate remedy at law, substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and public interest considerations.  Because the developer established extraordinary expenditures in reliance on the County’s strong support of its project, the DCA found that the developer had no adequate remedy at law.  However, the DCA also concluded that the trial court’s injunction went too far because it granted final relief prior to a decision on the merits of the case.  The DCA affirmed the injunction, but only insomuch as it ordered the County to “expeditiously proceed to complete” the permit application process pending the final hearing.