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COLUMNS
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DCA Update |
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Kelly Martinson |
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Ashley v. Franklin County, et al., DOAH Case No. 05-2361GM, First
DCA Case No. 1D07-0095
The Ashleys appealed a Final Order of the Administration Commission finding all
but a few challenged provisions of Franklin County’s evaluation and appraisal
report based amendments “in compliance.” The First DCA reversed the
Administration Commission’s finding that two future land use categories are not
mixed-use categories, as both categories contemplate a variety of uses in
addition to residential. The Rural Village category also permits a restaurant,
hotel services, an outfitters store, and recreational uses. As for the
Conservation Residential category, although it prohibits “[f]ree standing
non-residential or commercial uses intended to serve non-residents,” the First
DCA found it may by negative implication allow free-standing, non-residential,
commercial uses intended to serve residents. The case has been remanded to the
Administration Commission to determine whether the two categories comply with
the standards for mixed-use categories in Rule 9J-5.006(4)(c), F.A.C. A Motion
for Rehearing or in the Alternative Motion for Clarification filed by the
Ashleys is pending as of the writing of this update.
Runyan, et al. v. City of St. Petersburg, et al., DOAH Case No.
07-2239GM
Petitioners challenged the Department’s “in compliance” finding for an 18 acre
Future Land Use Map amendment in the City of St. Petersburg. Focusing on six
acres of the amendment going from Institutional to a category allowing a mix of
residential, office, and commercial, Petitioners alleged no need existed for
additional commercial uses and policies in the comprehensive plan restrict the
addition of commercial uses. Although not necessarily disputing that no need
exists for solely commercial uses, Respondents argued that the policies
restricting the addition of commercial uses do not apply to mixed use
categories. In support, Respondents pointed to plan policies that encourage
mixed use developments and infill. The ALJ agreed, issuing a Recommended Order
finding the amendment “in compliance.”
Grassy Key Beach Subdivision, Inc. v. City of Marathon, et al.,
2007-CA-240-M (Fla. 16th Cir.)
In this case, Plaintiff seeks to establish that it has a vested right under
Section 380.05(18), F.S., to develop property without regard to the Florida Keys
Area of Critical State Concern regulations and the Rate of Growth Ordinance that
limits the number of building permits that can be issued annually. Plaintiff
relies on the recordation of a plat by Plaintiff’s predecessor in title in 1950
and subsequent expenditures for improvements to the property (roads, canals,
potable water) by the three immediate past owners. In granting Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, the Court found that a subsequent purchaser must demonstrate
how it relied upon an official act of government and changed its position
because of such act and cannot tack on to the reliance and change of position of
a prior owner. Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint which Defendants have
moved to dismiss.
Judkins v. Walton County, Final Order No. DCA08-DC-003 (DOAH Case
No. 08-0302GM)
This case involves a Section 163.3213, F.S. challenge to a Walton County land
development regulation (LDR) as being inconsistent with the Walton County
Comprehensive Plan. Petitioners assert the LDR is inconsistent because it allows
borrow pits as a special exception from the land development code without
consideration for the land use category limitations in the comprehensive plan.
Although the LDR does not expressly restrict the land use categories in which
borrow pits may be allowed as a special exception, the Department determined it
is consistent with and implements the comprehensive plan because the
comprehensive plan allows borrow pits by special exception only in the General
Agriculture and Large Scale Agriculture land use categories. The issue is now
before the Division of Administrative Hearings and a hearing is set for April.
As of the writing of this update, the Judkins’ petition has been dismissed
without prejudice for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of
Uniform Rule 28-106.201, F.A.