COLUMNS
District Update -
St. Johns River
Water Management District
Rules
Rule Challenge: The Tomoka River Hydrologic Basin and the Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basin
In its opinion filed on July 29, 1998, the First District
Court of Appeals reversed the Administrative Law Judge's final order and unanimously held
that St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD) acted within the authority
delegated by the Legislature in adopting the proposed rules establishing special basin
criteria for the Tomoka River Hydrologic Basin and the Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basin. The
court declared the proposed rules to be valid. St. Johns River Water Management
District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 23 F.L.W. D1787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
July 29, 1998).
In February 1997, the SJRWMD published proposed revisions to
Chapters 40C-4 and 40C-41, Fla. Admin. Code, to establish special basin criteria for the
Tomoka River Hydrologic Basin and the Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basin in eastern Volusia
County. The rules would implement authority derived primarily from Sections 373.413,
373.416, and 373.418, Fla. Stat. The intent of the rules is to provide additional
protection to the designated Outstanding Florida Waters of the Tomoka River and Spruce
Creek and their hydrologic basins. The proposed rules consist of lower permitting
thresholds and four new standards: a groundwater recharge standard; a floodplain storage
standard; a stormwater management standard; and a Riparian Habitat Protection Zone
standard; which are to be applied in addition to the existing district-wide standards in
the Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) rules. A number of land owners in the Tomoka River
and Spruce Creek area challenged the proposed rules on six of the seven potential grounds
for invalidating rules under Section 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the proposed
rules were not vague, arbitrary or capricious, were supported by competent and substantial
evidence, and would "unquestionably accomplish the statutory objectives" of
protecting the water resources from harm. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. v. St. Johns
River Water Management District, 97 ER F.A.L.R. 132, ¶¶ 104, 112-115 (Fla. Div. of
Admin. Hearings June 27, 1997) (Case Nos. 97-0870RP and 97-0871RP consolidated).
Nonetheless, the ALJ held the proposed rules invalid by focusing on and restrictively
interpreting new language in Chapter 120 finding that "an agency may adopt only rules
that implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted by
the enabling statute." Id. The ALJ determined that the new phrase
"particular powers and duties" meant that the specific law to be implemented
must now be detailed, setting forth "particular," "detailed " powers
and duties and not just "general" ones. He concluded that the statutes cited by
the SJRWMD as its rulemaking authority - the same statutes cited for a large number of the
Districts' rules, including the ERP rules - did not contain sufficiently detailed powers
and duties to support rulemaking. The SJRWMD, joined by six amici curiae, appealed the
final order to the First District Court of Appeal.
In reversing the ALJ's final order, the First DCA held that
the "particular powers and duties" standard in Chapter 120 does not relate to
the level of detail in statutory language used to describe the agency's power. St.
Johns River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 23 F.L.W.
D1787, D1790 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. July 29, 1998). The court recognized that such an
interpretation would prove unworkable due to the fact that the sufficiency of detail in
statutory language is a subjective and relative concept. As such, it would be difficult to
define and apply, and would produce endless litigation regarding the sufficiency of
delegated powers. Rather, the court defined the question to be "whether the rule
falls within the range of powers the Legislature has granted to the agency." Id.
It is a functional test based on the nature of the power or duty in the statute being
implemented, not the level of detail in the statutory language. The court reasoned that
this approach meets the legislative goal of restricting the agencies' authority to
promulgate rules, while ensuring that the agencies will have the authority to perform the
essential functions assigned to them by the Legislature. Id. at D1790.
Applying the functional test, the First DCA held that all of
the rules proposed by SJRWMD are based on a valid exercise of delegated legislative
authority because the rules regulate a matter directly within the class of powers and
duties identified in Section 373.413, Fla. Stat. On August 13, 1998, Appellee Consolidated
Tomoka filed a Request for Rehearing En Banc, Rehearing, and/or Certification.
Uniform Rules of Procedure, Chapter 28, Fla. Admin. Code
The SJRWMD and other water management districts sought and
were granted exceptions from the Uniform Rules of Procedure found in Chapter 28-101
through 28-110, Fla. Admin. Code. The Uniform Rules of Procedure became effective July 1,
1998, for all agencies subject to Chapter 120. §120.54(5), Fla. Stat. The Administration
Commission granted SJRWMD's exceptions to retain existing procedural rules in Chapters
40C-1, 40C-3, 40C-4, 40C-20, 40C-21, and 40C-40, Fla. Admin. Code. Essentially, these
exceptions govern variances from portions of the Environmental Resource Permitting
requirements; variances from water well construction standards; variances from water
shortages; granting emergency variances within the timeframes allowed by monthly Governing
Board meetings; obtaining formal determinations of wetlands and other surface waters;
noticing agency decisions by newspaper publication and by mail; timeframes for providing
requested information regarding a permit or license application; emergency authorization
for activities regulated under Part IV of Chapter 373, Fla. Stat.; emergency authorization
of water well construction; and issuance of general permits in less than 90 days.
Caselaw
Saboffs v. St. Johns River Water Management District
The Saboffs owned a 0.72 acre parcel in a Seminole County
subdivision adjacent to the Little Wekiva River. The lot was located entirely within the
District's regulatory Riparian Habitat Protection Zone (RHPZ) for the Little Wekiva, an
area of heightened regulatory scrutiny adopted as part of the SJRWMD's Wekiva River
Hydrologic Basin rule in Chapter 40C-41, Fla. Admin. Code. Under the rule, a presumption
exists that any construction activities within the RHPZ, including land clearing, will
adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent
species provided by the zone, and therefore, may not meet the requirements for permit
issuance.
In 1991, the Saboffs applied to SJRWMD for a Management and
Storage of Surface Waters permit to construct a home, driveway, and swimming pool on their
lot. The District approved the permit subject to a mitigation permit condition requiring
that the Saboffs place a conservation easement over approximately one-half of the
waterward portion of their lot. The permit condition allowed the Saboffs to conduct
certain minimal activities within the easement. The Saboffs did not administratively
challenge the permit. However, third party environmental organizations requested an
administrative hearing based on the permit condition allowing specific minimal activities,
contending that the terms of the condition were nonspecific and too lenient. As a result
of the administrative proceeding, the conservation easement permit condition was revised.
The final easement condition allowed the Saboffs to remove trees less than four inches in
diameter, and build an elevated boardwalk to the Little Wekiva River, a treehouse, a
sandbox, a swing set, and a picnic table all within the conservation easement. During the
pendency of the administrative proceeding, all parties stipulated that the Saboffs could
proceed with construction, and the Saboffs completed construction of their home, driveway,
and pool.
Pending the administrative hearing, the Saboffs sued the
SJRWMD in circuit court asserting a claim of inverse condemnation, which was ultimately
dismissed. The circuit court reasoned that, when considering the property as a whole, the
Saboffs could not state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, because it was clear
that they were not deprived of substantial economic use of their lot with a permit to
construct the requested improvements. Saboffs v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, No. 91-2970 CA-16B (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. May 11, 1995). The Saboffs appealed
to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the lower court's judgment. Saboffs
v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 681 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (per curiam).
In November 1996, the Saboffs instituted the same inverse
condemnation claim in the federal district court of the Middle District of Florida. Saboffs
v. St. Johns River Water Management District, Case I, 96-1223-CIV. Orl-18 (M.D. Fla.
1998). The federal district court judge denied SJRWMD's various pre-trial motions and the
case proceeded to trial in May 1998. The judge held that the conservation easement
requirement constituted a taking and the jury subsequently awarded the Saboffs $114,000 as
compensation. The SJRWMD has filed post-judgment pleadings and, absent a change in the
judge's ruling, will appeal.
Cynthia A. Chritton is an attorney with the St. Johns River Water Management
District concentrating in the area of regulatory litigation. She received her B.S. from
Texas A&M University, her M.S. in Forestry from Stephen F. Austin State University,
and her J.D. from Seattle University.

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