To recover damages for strict liability as a result of an ultra-hazardous activity, plaintiff must show by the greater weight of the evidence that defendant [authorized or permitted another to carry on] [or] [knowingly assisted or participated in carrying on], upon premises owned or possessed by defendant, an activity that defendant knew or should have known was ultra-hazardous and which caused injury to plaintiff or damage to plaintiff’s property.

     In determining whether defendant’s conduct was ultra-hazardous, the following factors should be considered:

a.     existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
         chattels of others;
b.     likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
c.     inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
d.     extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e.     inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
f.     extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by the
        dangerous attributes.

Comment:  Florida courts have not addressed the issue of whether the court or the jury should make the determination that a particular activity is ultra-hazardous.  The majority of jurisdictions have followed Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, comment 1, and held that it is a question of law for the court.  See e.g., Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 175 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1961); Matomco Oil Co., Inc. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336 (Alaska 1990); McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635 (Ore. 1970); Funk v. General Motors, 220 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. App. 1974); but see, Ravan v. Greenville County, 434 S.E. 296 (So.Car. App. 1993); Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So.2d 248 (Ala. 1981); Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 571 S.W. 2d 74 (Ark. 1978).