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ARTICLES
DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UPDATE
Thomas
Mayton,
Assistant General Counsel
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
(September,
1997)
A. Statutory and Rule Challenge Cases
Criminal/Environmental Law -- Section 403.161, which makes a violation
of Chapter 403 or a permit issued by the Department of Environmental Protection
a misdemeanor, is not unconstitutional. State of Florida v. Avatar Development
Corp. and Amikam Tanel, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1740b (Fla. 4th DCA July 16,
1997)
In January of 1994, the Department of Environmental Protection (Department)
issued a permit authorizing Avatar to conduct certain dredge and fill activities.
The permit required Avatar to notify the Department at least 48 hours before
commencing the work authorized by the permit and to install floating turbidity
curtains in the project area. In November of 1995, the State charged Avatar
and Tanel by information with two misdemeanors under Sections 403.161(1)(b)
and 403.161(5) of the Florida Statutes, for willfully violating the notice
and turbidity control requires of the permit. The trial court dismissed
the information, finding these statutory provision unconstitutional on
three grounds because they: (1) violate Article I, Section 18 of the Florida
Constitution; (2) violate Article II, Section 3 of the the Florida Constitution;
and (3) they violate due process.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding
that Sections 403.161(1)(b) and 403.161(5) were constitutional, and remanded
to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the information. The
Court reasoned that there was no violation of Article I, Section 18, because
the Department had not conducted an administrative hearing or imposed any
penalties upon the appellees. Thus, the Department had not exercised any
quasi-adjudicatory powers over appellees. The Court devoted most of its
attention to Article II, Section 3. The Court reasoned that there was no
violation of Article II, Section 3, because a review of pertinent provisions
of Chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes revealed that the Department is
"subject to express legislative control and and guidance in the exercise
of its authority" and that it is "especially suitable" for
the Department to set terms and conditions for a permit to dredge and fill.
Finally, the Court found no violation of due process because appellees
received actual notice of the permit conditions when they received the
permit.
Petition challenging three computer models as non-rule policy and a
proposed rule to reestablish coastal construction control line (CCCL) for
Palm Beach County dismissed because Section 161.053(2)(a) does not allow
challenges to proposed CCCLs until such lines are adopted as a rule and
Petitioners lacked standing. Concerned Citizens of Highland Beach, Inc.;
James A. Barry, Jr. and Rosemarie Barry; and King Cayce and Patricia S.
Cayce V. Dep; DOAH Case No. 97-2839RU; ALJ Michael M. Parrish (Final Order
August 1, 1997).
Citizens challenged the Department's proposed rule to reestablish the
coastal construction control line (CCCL) for Palm Beach County (the County)
in a generally landward direction. In their petition, Citizens alleged
that the Department had used three computer models to create the proposed
CCCL for Palm Beach County, and that such models were unadopted agency
statements of general applicability that violated Sections 120.54(1)(a)
and 120.56(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). The only harm alleged
by Citizens was that their land would be subject to "increased regulation"
from the Department once the proposed CCCL became effective. In their prayer
for relief, Citizens requested the court to declare all three computer
models invalid as unadopted rules and to prevent the Department from adopting
the proposed CCCL for the County. In response, the Department filed a motion
to dismiss Citizens' petition on two grounds -- lack of ripeness and lack
of standing.
By order dated July 8, 1997, the court granted the Department's motion
to dismiss on both grounds and granted Citizens ten days leave to file
an amended petition. The court never used the term "lack of ripeness"
in its order. However, the court stated that Section 161.053(2)(a) of the
Florida Statutes prohibited any challenges to a proposed CCCL until the
CCCL became effective, to facilitate the reestablishment of a CCCL designed
to protect people and property. The court noted that as a tradeoff for
the Department's initial insulation from a challenge to a proposed CCCL,
the Legislature provided in Section 161.053(2)(a) two separate ways to
challenge an adopted CCCL. A person can either challenge an adopted CCCL
under Section 120.56(4) or request the Department to review the CCCL to
determine whether the line is unduly restrictive or prevents a legitimate
use of the owner's land, and the Department's determination is subject
to judicial review under Chapter 120. The court noted that Section 161.053(2)(a)
did not specifically mention Section 120.56(4) challenges. However, the
court recognized that Citizens' ultimate goal was to prevent the Department
from adopting the proposed CCCL, and held that Citizens' challenge to the
computer models was "the functional equivalent of a proposed rule
challenge under Section 120.56(2)...."
The court also held that Citizens lacked standing because Citizens failed
to allege any injury from the Department's use of the computer models.
The court noted that the only potential injury that Citizens might suffer
would stem from the adoption of the CCCL in the future, and that such possible
future injury was too "speculative and conjectural."
On August 1, 1997, the court entered a final order of dismissal because
Citizens failed to file an amended petition.
Note: Section 161.053(1)(a) requires the Department to establish CCCLs
taking into account the effects of a 100 year storm (among other things).
Section 161.053(3) requires as a "critical priority" that by
December 31, 1997, the Department reestablish CCCLs that had not been updated
since June 30, 1980. The old CCCL for the County was established in 1979
and did not take into account the effects of a 100 year storm. Thus, the
reestablishment of the County CCCL was a "critical priority"
that for safety reasons could not be delayed by a challenge to the proposed
rule.
B. Permitting Cases
Environmental association's petition could not be dismissed for lack
of standing as an association based solely on its articles of incorporation.
T.R.E.E.S. of St. Augustine, Inc. v. David B. Fleeman & Dep; DOAH Case
No. 97-0715, ALJ Donald R. Alexander (DEP Order of Remand July 8, 1997)
T.R.E.E.S. of St. Augustine, Inc. (TREES), a nonprofit corporation,
timely filed a petition challenging the Department's decision to issue
David B. Fleeman a coastal construction control line (CCCL) permit to build
six dune "walkovers" with gazebos seaward of the CCCL in an unincorporated
portion of St. Johns County. Fleeman filed a motion to dismiss the amended
petition for lack of standing as an association and attached a copy of
TREES' articles of incorporation. TREES' articles of incorporation had
not been attached to its amended petition. TREES' articles of incorporation
state that the specific purpose for which it was organized was to protect
and plant trees and educate people about trees. Fleeman argued that the
relief requested by TREES in the proceeding was ultra vires and exceeded
the scope of TREES' stated general and specific purposes of its articles
of incorporation, because there were no trees in the project area. In its
amended petition, TREES alleged that it had evolved as an organization
from its originally stated purpose and had branched out into other environmental
areas. Without an evidentiary hearing, the DOAH ALJ entered a recommended
order of dismissal based solely on the articles of incorporation.
The Department entered an order of remand that rejected the recommended
order of dismissal and remanded the case to DOAH for a final hearing. The
Department reasoned that it is improper for a court or administrative agency
to consider evidentiary matters beyond the four corners of the challenged
pleading in ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint or petition. The
Department found that TREES' articles of incorporation did not constitute
competent substantial evidence. The Department also noted that the issue
of whether a nonprofit corporation had standing to sue under the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, because of limitations in its articles of
incorporation, had been addressed in Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands,
711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983). In Save Our Wetlands, the trial court had
found that the organization did have standing to sue under the Federal
APA based on the testimony of the organization's president and a resolution
passed by the organization's board, despite the more limited purposes set
forth in the organization's articles of incorporation.

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